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Abstract
Tax amnesty programs have exploded in popularity among cash-strapped
states since the beginning of the Great Recession. Though many scholars
have been interested in the long-term tax compliance effects after amnesty
programs, this article is the first to consider short-run compliance effects
just prior to a known amnesty—a moral hazard effect leading to strategic
delinquencies. Evidence of this is detected from year-over-year tax revenue
change in quarters just prior to an amnesty program. Regression analysis on
pre-amnesty periods for state tax amnesty programs between 1982 and
2011 indicates that states experience higher pre-amnesty revenues when
recent delinquents are excluded from amnesty participation. The point
estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) indicated that about 4.3 to
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6.4 percent of an average amnesty’s recovery came from strategically
delayed payments, whereas IV/2SLS put the range at 12.9 to 16.5 percent.
Keywords
tax amnesty, tax planning, tax delinquency
The consequences of tax amnesties have drawn considerable attention from
public finance scholars interested in tax compliance. Though potentially rep-
resenting large infusions of cash to governments desperate for revenue, of
paramount concern has been whether such programs represent a ‘‘penny-
wise but pound-foolish’’ policy approach to revenue generation. In addition
to retrieving unpaid liabilities from delinquent accounts, the tax amnesties
can potentially entice evading taxpayers to voluntarily join the tax rolls. How-
ever, the amnesty could also increase the delinquency rate among future tax-
payers who infer the programs to be a reoccurring phenomenon. Taxpayers
can hardly be blamed for making such an inference; the most recent decade
(2000–2010) saw more tax amnesties than in the previous two decades com-
bined, and many of these were from states offering repeat programs.1 Though
states often try to combat this expectation with promises of amnesties being
‘‘onetime only’’ events to be followed with more vigorous post-amnesty
enforcement and stricter penalties, it is often difficult for current policy mak-
ers to make credible commitments to the actions of their future counterparts.2
While scholars will likely continue to gather evidence on post-amnesty
compliance and its long-term effect on revenue collection, this article seeks
to examine the consequences of a short-run source of moral hazard that
has previously gone unnoticed in the literature.3 Regardless of taxpayers’
long-run expectations of the likelihood of future amnesties, in the short-
run these programs are foreseeable through the policy process. Concern
over the fairness in offering amnesty to any form of lawbreaker generates
controversy, and tax law is no exception. This results in the process of
enacting a statewide tax amnesty becoming a readily foreseeable and
transparent event. For instance, Delaware’s 2009 tax amnesty program was
included in Governor Jack Markell’s successful gubernatorial campaign
platform in 2008.4 Furthermore, marketing campaigns ahead of the amnesty
program are considered necessary as the means to informing taxpayers of
the opportunity to participate and therefore maximize collections (Mikesell
1984, 1986; Parle and Hirlinger 1986).
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Policy debate, administrative preparation, and marketing efforts result in
a period of time prior to the actual execution of the amnesty where house-
holds and firms can account for it in their tax planning. Consider the
hypothetical case of a firm interested in a short-term, and often high-
interest, loan from a financial intermediary. If an amnesty is on the horizon,
then the firm could instead refuse to remit their biweekly/monthly (depend-
ing on the state and size of the firm) tax payments for sales and withhold-
ings, use that money in lieu of the loan, and then repay it during the amnesty
period. This would effectively treat the government as a competing, and
often interest-free, lender to other financial intermediaries. Similarly, an
individual with like circumstances may simply not file or delay paying their
end-of-year tax bill if given the opportunity and knowledge of the upcoming
amnesty. It is conceivable that such strategic tax planning could be com-
monplace and significant in amnesties, and there is some limited anecdotal
evidence to this point. Ritsema, Manly, and Thomas (2003) analyzed the
written comments from participants in the 1997 Arkansas amnesty program,
which required a statement from the taxpayer explaining the reasons for
their delinquency. Although the intended meaning is unclear, nearly half
(44 percent) of the responses described ‘‘intentional’’ reasons for tax delin-
quency. Accounting consultants often advise their clients to not immedi-
ately self-report if they discover they hold a nexus in a particular state,
but rather to look for amnesty opportunities (e.g., see Fleming 2011).
It is possible that this concern leads states, at least in some of their
attempts, to exclude the recently delinquent from being eligible for the
amnesty.5 This exclusion does not constitute a free lunch, as the trade-off
is forgoing the taxpayers who coincidentally become delinquent just prior
to an amnesty offering, but would be willing and able to become current via
the amnesty program. In this article, this group is referred to as the inciden-
tally delinquent, whereas the group which engages in tax planning will be
hereafter referred to as the strategically delinquent.
Excluding recently delinquent liabilities from amnesty eligibility affects
both the incidentally and the strategically delinquent taxpayers, and there-
fore reduces the potential pool of amnesty applicants. For the strategically
delinquent, this exclusionary period allows the state to collect a liability
earlier and with lower administrative cost, but comes at the sacrifice of
the incidentally delinquent. This suggests that, as with most issues that
involve law and justice, efficiency may not be the only relevant
consideration. The US legal system is arguably inefficient in the sense that
it does not attempt to minimize the sum of type I and type II errors in deter-
mining guilt. Instead, by putting the burden on the prosecution to prove
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guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the justice system implicitly considers the
conviction of innocents to be a much more significant error than allowing
the guilty to retain their freedom.6 In terms of tax amnesties, it could be
argued that deterring the strategically delinquent is normatively more
important than excluding the incidentally delinquent. Still, in making such
a determination, it would be informative for policy makers to know just how
commonplace strategic delinquency is by means of its effect on revenue
collections.
This article attempts to estimate the existence and extent of strategic
tax delinquency in response to upcoming tax amnesties. This is done by
explaining year-over-year changes in per capita state tax revenues in the
quarters immediately preceding tax amnesty programs. After controlling for
other relevant determinants, the main variables of interest relate to whether
or not those who become delinquent during the pre-amnesty period remain
eligible to participate in an upcoming amnesty. The exclusion increases rev-
enue collections in pre-amnesty quarters by a margin that is substantively
significant, and therefore suggests a deterrent effect on strategic tax plan-
ning. The result is robust to model specification, alternative dependent vari-
able definitions, and limiting the sample to states with similar tax structures.
The strongest findings are found when potential endogeneity in the use of
the exclusion is treated with instrument variable estimation.
Empirical Methodology
Identification Approach
The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax evasion informs the incen-
tives created by tax amnesty programs to motivate the empirical approach
of this article.7 In this model, taxpayers’ reported income is directly related
to the probability of detection and the penalties imposed if they are caught.
Consider first an amnesty program that would occur in the next period and
carries no complementary enforcement policy changes, so the penalties
from evasion in the current period decline. In this instance, any taxpayers
with a positive discount rate can increase the present value of their wealth
by underreporting their taxable liabilities or likewise delaying fixed
payments (i.e., negative cash flows) into the future. If this same amnesty
program restricts participation eligibility to only those who were delinquent
prior to the program announcement, that is, prior to the current period, then
there is no gain to delaying a tax payment or under reporting tax liabilities
beyond what already exists in the program’s absence. On the other hand, if
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the amnesty program permits participation among all delinquents prior to
the program’s execution, then delaying tax payments carries a more positive
net present value to strategic delinquency than would occur in the absence
of the amnesty. The identification of strategic tax delinquency behavior,
therefore, will come from comparing revenue collection when upcoming
amnesties exclude new and recently delinquent tax liabilities (Excludei,t)
to those which do not.
The empiricalmodel can beginwith a specification designed to explain pre-
amnestyquarterly tax revenue collectionper capita for state i in period t,Ri,t. Le
Borgne (2006) and Mikesell and Ross (2012) have demonstrated that, over
time, amnesty periods have increasingly followed recessionary periods of
fiscal stress, which suggests that control variables for business-cycle effects
(Xi,t) are likely necessary, as well as state specific fixed effects (pi). At this
point, a model for pre-amnesty revenue can be summarized as
lnðRi;tÞ ¼ Xi;tβþ dExcludei;t þ pi þ ei;t: ð1Þ
For brevity, quarter and year fixed effects are omitted from equation (1),
but will be included during the actual estimation of the final model.8
Time-differencing the model eliminates the state-specific time-invariant
fixed effects, and recognizing that the treatment effects are zero in the
one-year lag (Excludei,t4 ¼ 0), the resulting equation is9
lnðRi;tÞ  lnðRi;t4Þ ¼ ðXi;t  Xi;t4Þβþ dExcludei;t þ ðei;t  ei;t4Þ: ð2Þ
The left-hand side of equation (2) is now the year-over-year change in
quarterly real per capita tax revenue, and the implementation of natural
logs allows this to be interpreted in terms of percentage growth rates. The
parameter estimate on the exclusion variable, d, will be positive if it deters
strategic tax planning in the pre-amnesty period.
Equation (2) requires one further modification in cases where the
amnesty program is accompanied by other programs which change the
incentives to evade, such as with post-amnesty increases in the rates of
penalties and interest. While post-amnesty enforcement programs would
be irrelevant to a strategic tax evader looking to delay their tax payments
until amnesty, post-amnesty enforcement would affect the general return
to all forms of evasion, which may confound the results if the correlation
between the exclusion variable and the post-amnesty programs is not zero.10
Mikesell and Ross (2012) document a disappearance of post-amnesty
enforcement efforts over time, while we find that amnesty exclusionary
periods have become somewhat more common. Following Alm and Beck
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(1991), we control for post-amnesty increases in penalties and interest
separately, but represent them in equation (3) as a two-column matrix
Enforcei,t:
lnðRi;tÞ  lnðRi;t4Þ ¼ ðXi;t  Xi;t4Þβþ dExcludei;t þ Enforcei;tγ
þ ðei;t  ei;t4Þ:
ð3Þ
Why Do Some Amnesty Programs Exclude the Recently Delinquent?
Ideally, for the purpose of our study, the exclusion of the recently delin-
quent would be a randomly assigned feature of the amnesty program. The
second best case is that the Exclude variable is exogenous to the model
specified in equation (3), so that it is not endogenously determined by
the change in pre-amnesty tax revenue. Specifically, if states perceive that
the announcement of the amnesty will spur strategic delinquency among the
population and become more likely to adopt the exclusion, then it would
introduce a negative bias in the coefficient on Exclude, and cause it to
underestimate the level of strategic delinquency. In other words, the nature
of the endogeneity problem works against ordinary least squares (OLS)
detecting the hypothesized behavior. As such, the main results of the article
begin with OLS as the more conservative test, and then repeat the analysis
with instrument variable estimation.
Understanding why some programs exclude the recently delinquent can
be informative of the potential for endogeneity in the Exclude variable, as
well as what possible instruments might be valid. In the course of our
research, we were never able to uncover any public discussion of this exclu-
sion in the context of strategic delinquency, even when it was determined by
legislative statute to authorize the amnesty program, suggesting that such
behavior is likely not considered. Instead, most discussion concerns
whether the administrative personnel can simultaneously process delin-
quent claims and execute the amnesty program. Delinquency-collection
programs and staff are most active on new accounts, and typically spend
fewer resources chasing older accounts. When recent delinquents are eligi-
ble for the amnesty, staff from collection departments can wind up devoting
resources to pursuing overdue taxpayers who have already applied for
amnesty. This requires greater coordination between the regular collection
staff and those of the amnesty program to help identify which accounts have
applied for amnesty, as well as those whose applications are likely to be
approved. Furthermore, the preparation and marketing of an amnesty
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program often involves generating lists of known-but-uncollected accounts.
This list serves the dual function of providing a targeted population for
direct mailings of amnesty notices, and allowing administrators to gauge
program needs pertaining to staffing and resource allocation. For these
reasons, states tend to anchor the exclusion date to significant points in the
fiscal or tax administration year, such as July 1, April 1, or January 1.
Aside from administrative issues, the other theme that appears in deter-
mining the exclusion of the recently delinquent is a mimicry-of-features
behavior among the states. There is a notable tendency for states to repeat
either the policies of their previous amnesty offering, or to mimic another
state’s recent program. For instance, in 2010 when Pennsylvania would
once again exclude the recently delinquent, their after-action report simply
notes that the program was modeled after its 1995 predecessor, and there is
no discussion of maintaining the normal flow of delinquent revenues (Penn-
sylvania Department of Revenue 2010). Similarly, the after-action report
for the 2005 amnesty program in Indiana indicates that the other program
features were based on a case review of ten recent amnesty programs in
other states, adopting advice they received from administrators in those
states on running the program without overburdening the existing staff
(Indiana Department of Revenue 2006).
Since the exclusion is motivated by administrative issues like marketing
and staffing, or by mimicking previous programs, the policy of excluding
the recently delinquent from amnesty participation appears to be random
with respect to the potential for strategic delinquency and the year-over-
year change in tax revenues. Again, to the extent this is not true, OLS will
be biased toward finding no strategic delinquency.
This administrative burden as a determinant of the exclusionary period
motivates the choice of instrument variables used for IV/2SLS estimates.
While there are no data we are aware of that informs a state’s administrative
capacity, we can look to other variables which are known to have some
relationship to state administrative burden and resources.11 States have
historically piggy-backed their tax compliance efforts off the federal
government’s audit process (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde 1992; Birskyte
2008), so states that have routinely been among the most audited are less
reliant on their own administrative systems for compliance. The only major
available data on federal audits by states come from the Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse of Syracuse University between 1997 and
2001, so we adopt the dummy variable approach used by Mikesell and Ross
(2012) in estimating the amount of amnesty recovery, coded ‘‘1’’ if a state
averaged a top-fifteen ranking in federal audits between 1997 and 2001.
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Additionally, having a corporate income tax is another state characteristic
which increases administrative burden because states conduct audits and
help identify nexus. Being a historically high audit state (High Audit) and
not having a corporate income tax (No CIT) are both negatively correlated
with the use of an exclusionary period prior to amnesty. The use of these
dummies is intended to instrument for the use of the exclusion.12 Data
definitions are discussed in the Data and Identifying Relevant Periods Prior
to Amnesty subsection and first-stage instrument variable diagnostics are
reviewed with the results in the next section.
Data Considerations in Model Derivation
This section discusses the implications for model choice in employing total
per capita tax revenue for the dependent variable. States are often selective
in declaring which tax bases qualify for amnesty. For instance, sales tax or
corporate income tax liabilities might be excluded from eligibility. Even
when states announce that ‘‘all’’ taxes are eligible, as is common in policy
there are many footnotes to these proclamations that exclude particular
taxes or types of taxpayers from amnesty. As a first pass, the definition for
estimating equation (3) will use only changes in revenues that are derived
from taxes unambiguously eligible for the state’s amnesty program, hereto
referred to as ‘‘amnesty eligible revenue.’’13 This carries the advantage of
only looking at revenues that will ultimately be allowed to participate in the
amnesty, though the definition is not likely collectively exhaustive and
misses some revenues which are eligible. A natural alternative would
have been to employ control variables for the types of taxes that are omitted
from the amnesty program, but there was not enough commonality in
the type of taxes being excluded across amnesties to produce estimable
coefficients.
As a second pass to estimating equation (3), changes in total tax revenue
collections will be employed as the dependent variable. There are three
primary reasons to consider total revenue as the dependent variable as
opposed to the amnesty eligible counterpart. First, it will include revenues
which may be eligible for amnesty, but are not statutorily clear enough to be
included the first proposed measure of ‘‘amnesty eligible.’’ Second, in the
delinquency calculus, there may be complementary effects between taxes.
That is, taxpayers who engage in strategic delinquency to participate in the
tax amnesty for some taxes might become delinquent in additional taxes as
well. Similarly, taxpayers with a questionable nexus in a state can face
multiple taxes, but they might be more likely to come forward during an
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amnesty, even if that amnesty does not encompass their entire delinquent
tax burden.
The third reason pertains to the role of accounts receivable and how the
Census of Governments surveys state revenue sources. One of the largest
determinants of tax amnesty collections is whether taxes in accounts
receivable are eligible in the amnesty (Mikesell 1986). These amnesty
collections from taxpayers in accounts receivable are largely illusionary
in terms of recovered funds, as the state tax administrators were already
aware of the amount owed, had an identified taxpayer, and were capable
of taking action to collect the unpaid liabilities. When states collect through
accounts receivable, it is categorized as miscellaneous general tax revenue
for the period. Since the money does not get identified by the original delin-
quent tax, it will be missed by amnesty relevant revenue measures if the
amnesty only applies to particular taxes.
Data and Identifying Relevant Periods Prior to Amnesty
To our knowledge, there is no database identifying relevant restrictions in
the eligibility period for state tax amnesties. As such, we relied on a multi-
tude of sources in collecting this data: state statutes, tax administration press
releases, newspaper articles in LexisNexis, and correspondence with state
tax administrators.14 As can be seen in table 1, of the 106 amnesty programs
in the data set, 81 of them excluded the recently delinquent. The earliest
exclusion comes in North Dakota in 1983, the second year in which states
started offering tax amnesties and within the first five amnesties overall. In
1984, four of the seven state amnesties carried an exclusionary period.
Among states offering amnesties repeatedly, they largely appear to copy
whatever they did in the previous amnesties in terms of creating exclusions
for the recently delinquent, which is not particularly surprising since states
often model their programs on their previous experience. When they do
change over time, more often than not they are adding exclusionary periods
to the programs, though this is not always the case. Louisiana and New
York both excluded the recently delinquent in their earlier amnesties but not
in a later program.
Of the amnesties that excluded the recently delinquent, the duration of
this exclusion also varied from 0.2 to 3.0 years prior to the amnesty’s start-
ing date, with the mean exclusionary period lasting 0.8 years. The mean
exclusionary period is somewhat skewed upward with a median duration
of 0.67 years, and twenty amnesty programs excluded those who became
delinquent more than one year prior to the beginning of the program.
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Table 1. The Eligibility of the Recently Delinquent for State Tax Amnesties.
State Year
Excludes
recently
delinquent? State Year
Excludes
recently
delinquent?
Arizona 1982 No Massachusetts 2002 Yes
Idaho 1983 No Michigan 2002 Yes
Massachusetts 1983 No Missouri 2002 Yes
Missouri 1983 No Nevada 2002 No
North Dakota 1983 Yes New Jersey 2002 Yes
Alabama 1984 No New York 2002 Yes
California 1984 Yes Oklahoma 2002 No
Illinois 1984 Yes South Carolina 2002 Yes
Kansas 1984 Yes Arizona 2003 Yes
Minnesota 1984 Yes Colorado 2003 Yes
Oklahoma 1984 No Florida 2003 No
Texas 1984 No Illinois 2003 Yes
Colorado 1985 Yes Kansas 2003 Yes
Louisiana 1985 Yes Maine 2003 Yes
New Mexico 1985 No Massachusetts 2003 Yes
New York 1985 Yes Missouri 2003 Yes
South Carolina 1985 No North Dakota 2003 Yes
Wisconsin 1985 Yes Virginia 2003 Yes
Iowa 1986 Yes Arkansas 2004 Yes
Michigan 1986 Yes Mississippi 2004 Yes
Mississippi 1986 Yes Nebraska 2004 Yes
Rhode Island 1986 Yes Texas 2004 No
West Virginia 1986 Yes West Virginia 2004 Yes
Arkansas 1987 Yes California 2005 Yes
Florida 1987 No Indiana 2005 Yes
Louisiana 1987 No New York 2005 No
Maryland 1987 Yes Ohio 2006 Yes
New Jersey 1987 Yes Rhode Island 2006 Yes
Florida 1988 No Iowa 2007 Yes
Kentucky 1988 Yes Texas 2007 Yes
North Carolina 1989 Yes Nevada 2008 No
Connecticut 1990 Yes Oklahoma 2008 Yes
Maine 1990 Yes Connecticut 2009 Yes
Vermont 1990 Yes Delaware 2009 Yes
Virginia 1990 Yes Louisiana 2009 Yes
Georgia 1992 Yes Maine 2009 Yes
Connecticut 1995 Yes Maryland 2009 Yes
Pennsylvania 1995 Yes New Jersey 2009 Yes
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States tend to anchor the exclusion date to July 1, April 1, or January 1, all
of which tend to be significant dates for the fiscal or tax administration year.
This is supportive of the earlier observation that the exclusion period is
often determined on the basis of administrative record keeping rather than
on foresight of strategic tax planning.
The remaining significant issue in identifying the treatment effect is
defining the relevant periods prior to an amnesty. It would be expected that
the behavioral response of strategic tax planning would be between the
amnesty start and the point in time in which the taxpayer could reasonably
count on the amnesty actually occurring. In recent amnesties, the political
debate, legislative process, and administrative preparation cumulatively
appear to take several months to a year prior to the actual implementation
of the amnesty period.15 The Pennsylvania 2010 amnesty was on the faster
side with about six months between authorization, although this short notice
may be misleading as the program was part of a budget bill whose contro-
versial spending cuts delayed its passage more than 100 days from the bud-
get due date (Murphy 2009). Indiana’s 2005 program was overwhelmingly
approved by the Senate Ways and Means Committee on January 6, more
than nine months before the program began (Indiana Department of
Revenue 2006). Ohio’s 2012 general tax amnesty program was first
Table 1. (continued)
State Year
Excludes
recently
delinquent? State Year
Excludes
recently
delinquent?
New Jersey 1996 Yes Oregon 2009 Yes
New York 1996 Yes Vermont 2009 Yes
Rhode Island 1996 Yes Virginia 2009 Yes
New Hampshire 1997 No Florida 2010 No
Louisiana 1998 Yes Illinois 2010 Yes
Wisconsin 1998 Yes Kansas 2010 Yes
New Mexico 1999 Yes Maine 2010 Yes
South Dakota 1999 No Massachusetts 2010 Yes
Louisiana 2001 Yes Nevada 2010 No
Maryland 2001 Yes New Mexico 2010 Yes
New Hampshire 2001 No New York 2010 Yes
Ohio 2001 Yes Pennsylvania 2010 Yes
Arizona 2002 No Colorado 2011 Yes
Connecticut 2002 Yes Michigan 2011 Yes
Kentucky 2002 Yes Washington 2011 No
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introduced to the fiscal 2012–2013 budget bill twelve months prior to the
amnesty start date. After reviewing Lexus-Nexus newspaper articles from
the 1980s, it is our impression that the process unfolded over a similar time
frame in the cases of the earliest amnesties as well.16 However, there is no
objective way of identifying when exactly taxpayers would have started
their strategic planning for an upcoming amnesty. Instead, the main esti-
mates presents alternative specifications that differ by the amount of time
prior to the amnesty. To aid in explaining this approach, table 2 provides
an intuitive demonstration of the data to highlight the intended counterfac-
tual in the regression analysis.
All of the rows of table 2 represent a state’s particular amnesty that will
occur in the quarter designated by t ¼ 0, and the subsequent columns iden-
tify which periods a taxpayer can (Exclude ¼ 0) or cannot (Exclude ¼ 1)
become delinquent and still remain eligible for the amnesty.17 For instance,
New York’s 2005 amnesty did not exclude the recently delinquent, whereas
the 2003 program in North Dakota only excluded those within three months
of the amnesty. The other states in table 2 exclude the recently delinquent
for at least six months. If the data set is limited to the two quarters (within
six months) prior to the amnesty, the estimation of equation (3) would pick
up the variation coming from New York being considered an ‘‘Exclude’’ in
both periods and North Dakota being considered an ‘‘Exclude’’ in t  2
only, while all the others take ‘‘Allow’’ values. If the data set is expanded
to being within three calendar quarters of the amnesty period, New York
and North Dakota would continue being ‘‘Exclude’’ counterfactuals, but
it would also add the Indiana 2005 amnesty that only excluded those
becoming delinquent in the first two quarters from participation.
Table 2. Demonstration of Data from Selected States with Amnesty to Occur in
t ¼ 0.
State amnesty
Are taxpayers who become delinquent in this period
excluded from amnesty participation?
t  5 t  4 t  3 t  2 t  1
New York, 2005 Allow Allow Allow Allow Allow
Ohio, 2000 Allow Allow Exclude Exclude Exclude
Indiana, 2005 Allow Allow Allow Exclude Exclude
Louisiana, 2001 Allow Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude
North Dakota, 2003 Allow Allow Allow Allow Exclude
Note: In the data, each period is three months/one quarter (i.e., t is a quarter). The data above
would be coded as Exclude ¼ 1 if ‘‘Exclude’’ and Exclude ¼ 0 if ‘‘Allow.’’
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Figure 1 provides a bar graph comparing the means of these quarters,
both with and without the exclusion. In a simple comparison of averages,
amnesty programs excluding the recently delinquent in a given quarter
experience higher growth rates than states that do not. The exception is
in the quarter immediately prior to the amnesty, where those without the
exclusion have a higher average growth rate. One possibility for that kind
of effect is that it actually takes time to become delinquent in the eyes of
the state tax administration. A firm or household deciding to intentionally
become delinquent and pay later in the amnesty period would be less likely
to have the time to be far enough ‘‘past due’’ in order to be eligible as a
delinquent account.
Turning attention now to other controls employed in the regressions,
year fixed effects are included to help reduce national fluctuations not
specific to the state, and quarter fixed effects are included because tax
administration constraints are often thought to vary across the year. State
and time-variant quarterly controls that proxy for the change in economic
activity in the state are represented in matrix X. Since they will likely
correlate with the underlying components of the state tax base, natural
Figure 1. Comparison of mean amnesty eligible revenue growth for states with and
without exclusion of recently delinquent, by quarter.
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variables for these effects are changes in the unemployment rate and real
per capita personal income.18
Five amnesty programs were eliminated from the data set because they
occurred within two years of a previous amnesty program in the same state,
which confounds the revenue collection data for the year-over-year revenue
change variables. There was also missing quarterly data for the amnesty eli-
gible revenue (subcomponents of total revenue) that caused a loss of eight
and twelve observations in the nine- and twelve-month samples of data,
respectively. Another twenty-six amnesty programs are missing because
we could not verify post-amnesty interest and penalties. An earlier version
of this article excluded the post-amnesty variables and included the amnes-
ties with missing post-program features, yet the results were substantively
similar.19 Table 3 provides descriptions for the variables and their sources,
as well as summary statistics for the variables employed in this article.
Results
Results with Amnesty Eligible Revenue as the Dependent Variable
Table 4 provides the result of estimating equation (3) over quarters within
nine and twelve months of an amnesty period’s starting date.20 The first-
differenced measure of revenue collections are those derived from taxes
which were eligible for amnesty, as described in the Data Considerations
in Model Derivation subsection. To gauge the robustness of the findings,
specifications differ with the inclusion of the business cycle control vari-
ables of per capita income and unemployment rate, as well as quarter and
year fixed effects, but the ‘‘main’’ results include all of these controls
appearing in columns F and L. Reported in parentheses are the heterosce-
dastic robust standard errors clustered by state and quarter.21 All specifica-
tions control for whether the amnesty program was accompanied with a
state program to either increase penalties and interest (Post Penalties) or
some other enforcement (Post Enforce) program, which range from having
the predicted positive effect on revenues to no effect. The main variable of
interest is Exclude, which is the dummy variable identifying if a newly
delinquent taxpayer would be excluded from participating in the amnesty.
As hypothesized earlier in the article, a positive coefficient on Exclude is
taken as evidence that taxpayers are more likely to stay current on their tax
bills when they are not eligible for amnesty (Exclude ¼ 1). Alternatively
stated, they are more likely to strategically become delinquent when the
upcoming amnesty will allow them to participate (Exclude ¼ 0).
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As can be seen in table 4, the sign across all specifications is consistent
with the hypothesis that there is strategic tax planning, as the coefficient
on Exclude ranges from 0.020 to 0.066. For ease of interpretation, these
estimates are compared to a pre-amnesty period that would otherwise
Table 3. Variable Descriptions and Data Sources.
Within nine months Within twelve months
Variable M SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Dln(AE Revenue
Per Capita)
0.01 0.11 0.33 0.43 0.01 0.13 0.35 1.26
Dln(Tot Revenue
Per Capita)
0.01 0.09 0.33 0.26 0.00 0.11 0.35 0.82
Exclude 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.44 0.50 0 1
Post Penalty 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1
Post Enforce 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.41 0.49 0 1
Dln(PCPI) 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09
Dln(Unemp. Rate) 0.06 0.20 0.30 0.58 0.07 0.20 0.30 0.58
High Audit 0.29 0.46 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1
No CIT 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
Q1 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Q2 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1
Q3 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1
Note: Variable descriptions and Sources: Dln(AE Revenue Per Capita): Change in natural log of
quarterly tax revenue per capita that is eligible for amnesty from the same quarter in the previous
year, based on authors’ review of amnesty programs, the Federation of Tax Administrators,
US Census of Governments, and the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Dln(Tot Revenue
Per Capita): Change in natural log of total quarterly tax revenue per capita from the same quarter
in the previous year; US Census of Governments. Exclude: Dummy variable indicating that
taxpayers delinquent in the quarter are ineligible for participating in the amnesty program, based
on authors’ research from a variety of sources, contact for more information. Post Penalty:
Dummy variable where ‘‘1’’ indicates there will be an increase in penalties or interest on
delinquent liabilities after the amnesty period ends, else zero; Significant sources include Alm and
Beck (1991), Mikesell (1986), Mikesell and Ross (2012). Post Enforce: Dummy variable where ‘‘1’’
indicates there will be an increase in post enforcement efforts on delinquent liabilities after
amnesty period ends, else zero; significant sources include Alm and Beck (1991), Mikesell
(1986), Mikesell and Ross (2012). Dln(PCPI): Change in natural log of per capita personal income
from the same quarter in the previous year; US Bureau of Economic Analysis.Dln(Unemp. Rate):
Change in natural log of unemployment rate from the same quarter in the previous year;
US Bureau of Labor Statistics. High Audit: dummy where a value of ‘‘1’’ indicates the state’s mean
rank in federal audits between 1997 and 2001 was in the top-ten most audited; source is the
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse of Syracuse University. No CIT: Dummy variable
where ‘‘1’’ indicates that the state has no corporate income tax in the year of the amnesty.
Q(13): Quarter indicator where Q1 is January–March, Q2 is April–June, and so on.
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experience a 1 percent increase in revenue collection from the previous
year.22 Looking first at the sample limited to quarters within nine months
of amnesty, the point estimates of the main results in column F indicate that
excluding the recently delinquent would increase amnesty eligible revenue
collection rates by 0.041 percent. Expanding the sample to twelve months,
the point estimate of the main result in column L suggests the exclusion
creates a 0.064 percent increase. Both of these results are statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level.
Results with Total Tax Revenue as the Dependent Variable
In the Why Do Some Amnesty Programs Exclude the Recently Delinquent?
subsection, the argument was made for the use of amnesty relevant tax rev-
enue as the first metric for testing the presence of strategic tax delinquency.
This section uses the more expansive measure of total tax revenue per
capita. It is possible there are spillover effects with respect to delinquency,
that is, a taxpayer finds it in their advantage to become delinquent in all
taxes if they are to be delinquent in any, which may help them avoid detec-
tion, although it is also possible this would only add more noise to the
regression error. One final additional advantage of this measure is that the
coefficients can be compared to the average amnesty recovery as a share of
state total tax revenue, which was 0.7 percent during this period.
Table 5 presents the results for the same specifications from table 4,
but with this alternative dependent variable. The results are similarly
consistent with strategic delinquency, but with slightly smaller coeffi-
cients and generally lower statistical significance levels owing to the
fact it is including revenues which rely upon spillover delinquency into
noneligible revenues. The main results of 0.030 in column F and 0.046
in column L represent 4.3 and 6.4 percent, respectively of the average
amnesty recovery.23
Results from States with Similar Tax Structures
In some previous work on tax amnesties, most notably Dubin, Graetz, and
Wilde (1992) and Luitel and Sobel (2007), regression analysis is based on
an exante selection of states that do not omit a major broad-based tax.24
Therefore, table 6 estimates the model in equation (3) using the same set
of states as in those two previous papers, estimating the full models for both
revenue measures, making them analogous specifications to columns F and
L in tables 4 and 5.
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The results in table 6 are consistent with strategic delinquency and are
similar in the magnitude across the specifications within the table and to the
previous results in tables 4 and 5. Excluding the recently delinquent from
participating in the amnesty is correlated with a 0.034 to 0.045 percent
increase in revenue. Despite losing about 12 percent of the sample, statisti-
cal significance is weakened to meeting the 5 percent confidence level for
only the two specifications that are within twelve months of the amnesty.
Results from IV/2SLS
Table 7 presents the second-stage results of IV/2SLS of equation (3), along
with diagnostics on the chosen instruments discussed in the Why Do Some
Amnesty Programs Exclude the Recently Delinquent? subsection, which
were dummy variables for whether or not the state was a historically
high-audit state and whether or not it taxed corporate income. An F-test
of the excluded instruments ranges from 21 to 39, exceeding the commonly
Table 6. Regression Results for the Change in Amnesty Eligible Tax Revenue per
Capita Collection Prior to Amnesty for States with Similar Tax Structure.
Dependent
variable
Dln(AE revenue per capita) Dln(Tot revenue per capita)
Sample periods:
Within nine
months
Within twelve
months
Within nine
months
Within twelve
months
Exclude 0.040 0.045** 0.034 0.039**
(0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017)
Post Penalty 0.003 0.013 0.014 0.022
(0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Post Enforce 0.029 0.023** 0.025 0.021*
(0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011)
Dln(PCPI) 0.352 0.168 0.512 0.416
(0.508) (0.336) (0.564) (0.427)
Dln(Unemp.
Rate)
0.089 0.127 0.079 0.122
(0.102) (0.090) (0.094) (0.092)
Intercept 0.017*** 0.047*** 0.008 0.044***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.014) (0.006)
R2 .407 .380 .370 .361
Sample size 172 233 172 233
Note: Year and quarter fixed effects (FE) included in all specifications. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by state and quarter. Statistical significance indicated at the
1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) level.
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employed rule of thumb that it be at least 10. Since two instruments are
employed, the p value of the Hansen test for overidentification is reported,
and in all cases it cannot reject the null hypothesis of a just-identified system.
The effect on the exclusion of the recently delinquent also demonstrates
that it has the predicted influence if the policy was being adopted in cases
where policy makers anticipated that a strategic response would be rela-
tively strong. The IV/2SLS estimates on Exclude in table 7 are larger and
have a greater level of statistical significance than their counterparts in col-
umns F and L of tables 4 and 5. In table 4 with the amnesty eligible revenue
results, the main estimates reported coefficients of 0.041 and 0.064 that
were statistically significant at the 5 percent level, whereas table 7 indicates
that the responsiveness is 0.094 and 0.082 with statistical significance at the
1 percent level, respectively.25
Table 7. IV/2SLS Estimates of Equation (3).
Dependent variable Dln(AE revenue per capita) Dln(Tot revenue per capita)
Sample periods
Within nine
months
Within twelve
months
Within nine
months
Within twelve
months
Excludea 0.094*** 0.082*** 0.116*** 0.090***
(0.037) (0.031) (0.021) (0.032)
Post Penalty 0.003 0.012 0.011 0.004
(0.012) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011)
Post Enforce 0.034*** 0.012 0.027*** 0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
Dln(PCPI) 0.335 0.104 0.532 0.402
(0.363) (0.212) (0.373) (0.251)
Dln(Unemp. Rate) 0.080 0.092** 0.049 0.093*
(0.056) (0.038) (0.049) (0.048)
Intercept 0.062*** 0.019 0.062*** 0.011
(0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015)
R2 0.382 0.230 0.244 0.214
Sample size 196 267 199 272
F-test excluded
instruments
39.369 23.405 31.780 21.231
Hansen
overidentification
p value
.238 .325 .793 .949
aIndicates the variable treated for endogeneity. Year and quarter fixed effects (FE) included in
all specifications. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state and quarter.
Statistical significance indicated at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) level.
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A similar story emerges with the results for total revenues. The main
results in table 5 found the coefficient to be 0.030 and 0.046 for the nine-
and twelve-month sample, with only the twelve-month sample being
statistically significant. The corresponding results in table 7, after instru-
mentation, indicate that the magnitude is 0.116 and 0.090 with statistical
significance at the 1 percent level. These magnitudes are equivalent to
12.9 to 16.5 percent of an average amnesty recovery.26
Conclusion
The announcement of an amnesty period potentially allows unknown tax
evaders to voluntarily reveal themselves to the authorities in the near future,
ideally for the purpose of becoming permanently compliant taxpayers.
Much of the policy concern and attention from academics has been in the
ability of the amnesty to permanently improve long-run compliance, as it
may have the unintended consequence of revealing tax evasion as a profit-
able pursuit or by causing the perception that amnesty will be a frequently
reoccurring phenomenon (e.g., Alm, McKee, and Beck 1990; Luitel and
Sobel 2007). This article suggests that another possibility is that an
announced amnesty will cause some compliant taxpayers to become tempo-
rarily delinquent, effectively treating the state as a short-term loan officer.
In doing so, this article also contributes to the broader literature on strategic
tax planning and delinquency.
To study this moral hazard problem, this article makes use of variation in
amnesty eligibility exclusion periods, which is generally a short time prior
to the amnesty’s beginning for which a taxpayer cannot become delinquent
and still participate in the amnesty. If these exclusions prevent some tax-
payers from becoming strategically delinquent, their quarterly state tax rev-
enues during pre-amnesty periods should be greater than those which do not
carry such an exclusion.
In all cases, the first-differenced regression estimates provided signs that
are consistent with the behavior of strategic tax planning. Though statistical
significance is sensitive, the magnitude and direction of the effect across
different model specifications, sample choice, and revenue definition in the
dependent variable are robust. The point estimates from OLS indicated that
about 4.3 to 6.4 percent of an average amnesty’s recovery came from stra-
tegically delayed payments, whereas IV/2SLS put the range at 12.9 to 16.5
percent.
If states wish to deter strategic tax planning and maintain constant rev-
enue collections, then excluding new delinquents appears to be a successful
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strategy. Alternatively, if the cost–benefit analysis on a potential amnesty
program is being conducted, then the results also imply that the new reve-
nue estimate should be discounted by 4 to 16 percent. The results are the
strongest in examining the revenue from tax instruments eligible for
amnesty, suggesting that policy makers are not experiencing a spillover
of delinquencies by limiting amnesty offering to certain types of tax
instruments.
The trade-off to the policy of excluding the recently delinquent, of
course, is that taxpayers who would become delinquent even in the absence
of the amnesty are also not capable of participating. Since the cost of the
exclusion is forgoing incidentally delinquent taxpayers, this article’s esti-
mates also provide a normative benchmark as the cost of their exclusion.
Future research might examine the size of the group behaving strategically
relative to the group which enters delinquency for reasons independent of
the amnesty.
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Notes
1. For instance, New York has offered four tax amnesties since 1996, with its first
amnesty in 1985.
2. This article deals exclusively with state governments, which have been running
temporary amnesty programs since 1981. The US Bureau of Internal Revenue
did operate a ‘‘permanent amnesty’’ program at the federal level from 1919 to
1952 (Andreoni 1991, 144). Many states also have a voluntary disclosure
program that forgives criminal prosecution to self-reporting evaders. The
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Multistate Tax Commission also operates a Multistate Voluntary Disclosure
Program that permanently runs in place to allow a non-filer to negotiate a
settlement for back liability for taxpayers with nexus in multiple states.
3. For literature on the long-term effects, see Alm and Beck (1990, 1991, 1993);
Alm, Mckee, and Beck (1990); and Luitel and Sobel (2007).
4. The Delaware tax amnesty was first proposed in an issue position statement in
(Setze 2009).
5. To be clear, the exclusion applies to the age of the unpaid liability, rather
than the point in time when a taxpayer first became delinquent. For example,
a taxpayer’s income tax bill may be due in March or April for income earned
in the previous calendar year, and so they would not become delinquent until
thirty to sixty days after that tax bill’s due date. However, the taxpayer’s ability
to participate in the amnesty would depend on whether the liability’s calendar
year is eligible.
6. An alternative or complementary view might be that this is a constraint on
government for its potential to abuse police powers.
7. Other examples of research on tax amnesty programs that are modeled in
the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) tradition include Alm and Beck (1991),
Malik and Schwab (1991), Stella (1991), and Macho-Stadler, Olivella, and
Pe´rez-Castrillo (1999). There is a large literature on the determinants of tax
evasion and delinquency. Within this literature, there is wide agreement that the
determination of tax evasion is more complicated than an agent maximizing net
present value, but this is the margin that is affected by the announced amnesty.
For a recent literature review on the theory and evidence of tax evasion, see Alm
(2012).
8. Using logged values of revenues also helps reduce heteroscedasticity in the
revenue data.
9. In public budgeting, the year-over-year quarterly change is the most common
approach to analyzing trends, which motivates the use of a one-year lag in
this article. See Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) for a critique of
difference-in-difference estimates.
10. The authors wish to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this important
point.
11. An IV/2SLS approach was attempted with program mimicking intuition
described by program administrators. The instruments tested included the use
of an exclusion in a previous program, and the share of the amnesty programs
which excluded the recently delinquent in the most recent year with an amnesty.
Though these instruments were statistically significant determinants of exclud-
ing the recently delinquent, they failed every traditional instrument diagnostic
test. For instance, the F-statistic on the exclusion of the instrument was less than
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2 in all specifications, and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity failed to
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity with p values in the range of .30 to .90.
12. We wish to thank an anonymous referee for pointing us in the direction of this
genre of instruments.
13. The authors were largely aided by amnesty details from the Federation of Tax
Administrators, Mikesell (1986), and Parle and Hirlinger (1986) in identifying
eligible taxes.
14. Due to the high number of varied sources, they are available in a spreadsheet
from the authors upon request. The source types were typically press releases,
news articles, and state legislation.
15. Most amnesty programs are legislatively authorized, but a few have been at
the will of tax administrators or at the request of the state executive branch.
However, even in these cases, it is clearly not a politically opaque process,
but one that seems to occur with the permission or cheerleading of major
political actors.
16. For example, the New York 1985 amnesty was formally introduced to
Legislature in February, passed in April, and executed in November (Gargan
1985). Virginia’s legislature authorized an amnesty that began February 1,
1990, in a bill that passed in March of the previous year (Virginia Department
of Taxation 1989).
17. This is the Exclude indicator variable, where Exclude ¼ 1 and Allow ¼ 0.
18. Also attempted where some controls for additional state characteristics intro-
duced ad hoc to the first-differenced model, such as whether or not the state had
previously executed an amnesty program before and whether or not they had a
voluntary disclosure program. Their effect was substantively small with very
low t-statistics, suggesting their potential influence was a fixed effect and there-
fore mitigated by the first differencing.
19. The previous version of the article with these results is viewable at https://
sites.google.com/site/jross08/OLD_Amnesty10.docx.
20. Limiting the data to quarters within six months of an amnesty yields results that
are very similar to the reported values within nine months, but with smaller
t-statistics. They are omitted for space but are available upon request.
21. Clustering standard errors is used to mitigate cross-sectional and or/or serial
correlation, such as that documented in Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2010.
Stata code used to cluster standard errors came from ‘‘cluster2’’ program by
Petersen (2009) and ‘‘ivreg2’’ program by Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman
(2010). Alternative specifications of clusters by year or amnesty program had
no qualitative impact on the results.
22. The precise interpretation of the dummy variable coefficients would actually be
exp(g)  1, but in this case the coefficients are just a difference in rounding.
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23. Calculations for amnesty recovery share: 0.030/0.7¼ 0.043; 0.046/0.7¼ 0.065.
24. Luitel and Sobel (2007) use the same selection of states as Dubin, Graetz, and
Wilde (1992). The full list of states excluded are those that omit a broad-based
tax: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Montana, New Hampshire,
Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
25. Since the first stage is a linear probability model, the interpretation of the
dummy variable changes to be a move from a 0 percent to a 100 percent
predicted probability of excluding the recently delinquent.
26. Calculations: 0.116/0.7 ¼ 0.165 and 0.09/0.7 ¼ 0.129.
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